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1. Overview 
The private sector producing and distributing mosquito nets in malaria control has been exposed 
to factors beyond usual market influences. The supply of untreated nets was diverse and often 
local. It was maintained with the introduction of insecticide treatment sachets (supplied by 
donors) to bundle with untreated nets sold by retailers. Voucher schemes aimed at targeting 
vulnerable groups e.g. pregnant women and young children aimed to sustain and expand the 
commercial sector through public private partnership. The biggest influences on the private 
sector was a huge increase in donor funding of free mass campaigns and the WHO and the 
Global Malaria Programme change in 2007 in the overall global strategy from targeted protection 
of vulnerable groups (pregnant women and children under 5 years old) to universal coverage and 
recommendation of long lasting insecticide treated nets (LLINs) instead of insecticide treated 
nets (ITNs). The private sector then had to compete with international companies with the 
technology to produce LLINs; bulk purchasing by donors; higher unit costs; and competition with 
free distribution by donors through the established network of the healthcare system.  
Donor funding is now levelling and there remains a gap in funding required to meet universal 
coverage with LLINs. Donors and country programmes are now exploring keep-up strategies that 
rekindle, expand and diversify the role of the private sector in the sustainable production and 
distribution of LLINs. Commercial markets are a valuable source of nets and where strong 
commercial markets exist or are developing, they should be encouraged as they can provide 
important benefits, ensuring longer-term access and enhancing management of logistics and 
education efforts. However, lessons must be learnt from the impact of mass campaigns of free 
nets and a change in global policy.  
This report provides a review of key literature and evidence on the LLINs and private sector. The 
evidence base for this report is vast and spans more than twenty years of research evidence, 
policy documents and implementation programme evaluations and data from sub Saharan Africa 
and Asia. The relevant literature spans academic publications in biological and social sciences 
as well as implementation science and health economics. 
This report supplements the pre-existing evidence base with original analysis by experts in the 
field: Efundem Agboraw and Eve Worrall from LSTM. The authors have applied a traditional 
economic theory framework to analyse the barriers and opportunities to expanding the role of the 
private sector in the distribution of LLINs in sub-Saharan Africa and in the production of LLINs. 
The report also includes the authors’ original presentation and analysis of data from various 
sources on LLINs and the private sector. A mind map of the constraints to impeding the growth of 
the commercial sector in LLIN markets is provided in Annex 2.  
Key Findings 
• The private sector is diverse and ranges from owners of small shops or market stalls 
selling mosquito nets to huge multi-national corporations manufacturing millions of LLINs 
a year. Supply side actors interact dynamically with numerous demand side actors at 
multiple levels resulting in an extremely complex market. As LLINs are a donor-financed 
public good, global and country level health policy influences the role and activities of 
private sector actors, involving them in non-traditional market activities such as obtaining 
regulatory approval for public health use and responding to public tenders.  
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• The demand side of the LLIN market is dominated by procurement of LLINs by public 
health actors on behalf of end users. Free mass distribution campaigns have allowed a 
fast increase in coverage of LLINs (‘catch-up’). Keep-up strategies have tended to have 
similar procurement and financing, with distribution being coordinated by National Malaria 
Control Programmes (NMCPs) using systems such as antenatal care, expanded 
programme on immunisation or various community based models (e.g. community health 
workers or volunteers). However, this may have dampened demand for LLINs provided 
through the private retail sector, even when highly subsidised, with a negative effect on 
the commercial LLIN market.  
• LLINs are a public health intervention so the argument for subsidy to increase 
consumption of merit goods and improve equity is strong. Several demand side voucher 
schemes were implemented to provide a way of subsidising the price paid by consumers 
(often pregnant women and children) without bypassing (crowding out) the private sector 
distribution mechanism. The most well-known of these schemes is the Tanzanian 
National Voucher Scheme (TNVS). Comparison with the Ghanaian voucher scheme 
which was never implemented has highlighted the importance of context. 
• Enabling factors which may expand and diversify the private sector’s role in the 
production and distribution of LLINs include: 
o Engagement of all stakeholders (public and private – formal and informal) in a 
sustained, well-coordinated and managed partnership with a shared vision. 
o Favourable insecticide regulatory conditions and harmonised regulatory 
standards at regional level. 
o Permanent removal of any form of taxation and tariffs on end product and LLIN 
material (which could be tailored in-country) and reintroduction of tax on ITNs.  
o Communication well in advance of mass distribution and support of the private 
sector through training to retailers as well as potential credit mechanisms to allow 
increased stocks ahead of issuing of vouchers. 
o Generic demand creation by the public sector e.g. social marketing that directly 
engages the local manufacturer and primes the market for them. 
o A reduction in donor dependency through targeted subsidy schemes for 
vulnerable groups coupled with commercial sale of a more expensive range of 
products which meet preferences of consumers who are willing and able to pay 
for LLINs.  
o Diversification in vector control strategies including greater emphasis on housing 
improvements (e.g. screening) and personal protection measure in providing 
protection against disease vectors. 
o Advocacy of the private sector to invest could create awareness and sensitise 
businesses that it is economically beneficial to invest in malaria control by 
estimating the economic burden of malaria on businesses.  
• Challenges in expanding and diversifying the private sector’s role in the production and 
distribution of LLINs include: 
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o Equity of access to LLIN and other malaria prevention, treatment and diagnostics 
o Developing a commercial market in poor and/or rural areas  
o Addressing the higher unit cost of LLINs (and next-generation LLINs in areas of 
resistance). High-level global subsidies may need to be considered to improve 
the availability of affordable high quality products. 
o Developing effective strategies to tackle fake LLINs and fraud 
Further research is required to determine whether it is possible to combine free LLINs delivered 
through mass campaigns (perhaps targeted to groups most at risk including pregnant women, 
infants and school children) with a system which relies on the commercial sector to distribute 
LLINs, and to determine whether the coverage achieved through this combined system is more 
sustainable than that which any one system can achieve on its own. 
2. Conceptual Framework 
In 2015 there were an estimated 212 million new cases of malaria and 429 000 deaths (World 
Health Organization, 2016). The WHO African Region continues to dominate the number of 
cases with an estimated 90% of malaria cases and 92% of malaria deaths in 2015. The WHO 
South-East Asia Region accounted for 7% of global malaria cases and 6% of malaria deaths. 
Sleeping under a mosquito net protects the individual user from mosquito bites, but treating the 
net with an insecticide turns it into a public health intervention: effective insecticides kill 
mosquitoes, preventing further transmission.  
In sub-Saharan Africa, the percentage of the at risk population that slept under an ITN/LLIN 
increased from 5% to 53% between 2005 and 2015 (World Health Organization, 2016). Over the 
past decade, there have been significant advancements made towards achieving malaria control-
related goals and the scale-up of interventions has resulted in declines in malaria mortality and 
morbidity (World Health Organization, 2016). The scale-up of vector control, and the increased 
coverage and use of LLINs, is considered a major contributor to these achievements. Bhatt et al. 
estimated that 68% of the malaria cases averted between 2000 and 2015 were due to bed net 
use (Bhatt et al. 2015). However, these recent gains in malaria control could be jeopardised by 
mosquito resistance to the insecticides used on ITN/LLINs and inadequate financing to maintain 
coverage levels. Global investment for malaria increased between 2000 and 2010. However, 
funding has since levelled, totally US$ 2.9 billion in 2015; less than half of the 2020 milestone of 
US$ 6.4 billion (World Health Organization, 2016). This has led to concerns about the future of 
LLIN coverage, and a renewed interest in looking for additional private sector investment to 
finance, produce and deliver LLINs. 
Box 1 Definition of Untreated Mosquito Net, ITN and LLIN 
An untreated mosquito net is a net that is used to protect the user from the bites of 
mosquitoes. It does not kill mosquitoes and therefore has no public health benefit  
An insecticide-treated net (ITN) is a mosquito net that repels, disables and/or kills mosquitoes 
coming into contact with insecticide on the netting material. 
A LLIN is a factory-treated mosquito net made with netting material that has insecticide 
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incorporated within or bound around the fibres. The net must retain its effective biological 
activity without re-treatment for at least 20 WHO standard washes under laboratory conditions 
and three years of recommended use under field conditions.  
Source: Authors 
The framework underpinning this report is traditional economic theory which analyses markets 
according to demand and supply side actors against the theory of a perfectly competitive (free) 
market. The product of interest is the LLIN as defined by the WHOPES evaluation standard. 
However, particularly at a household/retail level, LLINs compete with other mosquito nets that 
may be treated with insecticide or not. Thus, the scope of the market analysis encompasses the 
broad market for mosquito nets. For the purposes of this report, we define private sector as the 
for-profit private sector. This excludes all Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) or 
charities. The private sector is diverse and ranges from owners of small shops or market stalls 
selling mosquito nets to huge multi-national corporations manufacturing millions of LLINs a year. 
Just like in a perfectly competitive market, these supply side actors interact dynamically with 
multiple demand side actors at many levels resulting in an extremely complex market.  
The demand side of the LLIN market is dominated by procurement of LLINs by public health 
actors on behalf of end users. Thus, the market size for LLINs is determined by global health 
(malaria) policy and financing, via its impact on (endemic) country level demand. The demand for 
untreated and insecticide treated mosquito nets is less influenced by public health actors, and is 
closer to that of a competitive market, with the tastes, preferences, and choices of individual 
consumers making up country and global level demand.  
The supply side market functions of interest are the production and distribution of LLINs. Our 
conceptual framework (Figure 1), recognises that in the LLIN market these functions may 
overlap, and involve a set of traditional private for-profit sector activities, ranging from product 
research and development (R&D), testing, manufacturing, delivery to distribution. However, 
because LLINs are a predominantly donor-financed public good, global and country level health 
policy influences the role and activities of private sector actors, involving them in less non-
traditional market activities such as obtaining regulatory approval for public health use and 
responding to public tenders. A further complication is that the LLIN market is global, but some 
activities (e.g. testing, regulatory approval, tendering, delivery) often take place globally and must 
be repeated in multiple countries either in parallel or sequentially.  
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Figure 1. Conceptual Framework: Functions, Activities and Description of LLIN markets where private 
sector plays a role 
 
 
Source: Authors 
3. LLIN Demand Side 
Market Failure 
The public health rationale for subsidised vector control is clear, but the economic argument for 
subsidy is also strong and focuses on two key concerns (market failures); the need to increase 
consumption of merit goods and address health and economic inequity. LLINs are a classic 
example of merit goods, generating positive externalities (malaria transmission reducing effects) 
which are not fully recognised by users, resulting in sub-optimal demand (under consumption). 
Poverty and lack of knowledge of the benefits of LLINs amongst communities, coupled with 
inadequate resources to meet health needs in most developing countries, means that without 
international donor intervention, LLINs use would not achieve the coverage levels required to 
reap the public benefits. In turn this failure to use effective tools to address the economic burden 
of malaria which falls disproportionately on the world’s poorest countries would exacerbate 
inequity. These arguments were put forward convincingly in the 1990’s leading to a massive 
increase in public and philanthropic financing, a donor driven LLIN market and extensive LLIN 
distribution via public sector channels in malaria endemic countries.  
Public Sector Intervention 
A brief history of global health policy in relation to ITNs and LLINs is presented below to help the 
reader understand the origins of current global demand for LLINs. Running alongside these 
developments are key milestones in global health policy, notably the adoption of the Millennium 
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Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000 which specifically called for donors and countries to combat 
malaria and reduce child mortality. 
1984-1999 Development ITNs as a public health tool 
The first successful evaluation of pyrethroid impregnated (treated) mosquito nets against malaria 
vectors was published in 1984 (Darriet, Robert, Tho Vien, & Carnevale, 1984). In the 1990s, 
studies showed that mosquito nets treated with pyrethroid insecticides (ITNs) were safe and 
highly efficacious in reducing all cause childhood morbidity (D'Alessandro et al., 1995) and were 
highly cost-effective (Goodman, Coleman, & Mills, 1999). These developments sparked a debate 
about how to best to distribute and finance mosquito nets and insecticides (Lines, 1996) which 
continues today.  
2000-2007 Emergence of LLIN technology 
In 2004 a Cochrane review on ITNs concluded that “ITNs are highly effective in reducing 
childhood mortality and morbidity from malaria”(Lengeler, 2004). However, nets had to be treated 
with insecticide every six to 12 months to maintain a level of protection that went beyond the 
physical barrier of the net. Even where single treatment sachets of suitable insecticide were 
commercially available and in areas where mosquito net use was traditional and well-
established, up take was low (Kilian, A, 2013).  In response to this, WHO stimulated net 
manufacturers to produce LLINs and by 2001, two were commercially available. WHO’s 
Pesticide Evaluation Scheme (WHOPES) recommended Sumitomo Chemical’s Olyset Net® as 
an LLIN for malaria control in 2001 (World Health Organization, 2001) and granted “interim 
recommendation” to Vestergaard-Frandsen’s PermaNet® 2.0 in January 2004 (World Health 
Organization, 2004). 
2007-present Push for Universal Free Access to Vector Control with LLINs 
In 2007, the WHO issued a position statement on the use of LLINs for malaria prevention (World 
Health Organization Global Malaria Programme, 2007). For the first time, WHO recommended 
that insecticidal nets be long-lasting, and distributed either free or highly subsidised (either 
directly or through voucher/coupon schemes) for full coverage of all people at risk of malaria, 
marking a shift from the focus on pregnant women and children under five years old. WHO also 
recommended that national malaria control programmes and their partners involved in 
insecticide-treated net interventions implement strategies to sustain high levels of LLIN in parallel 
with strategies for achieving rapid scale-up. Although WHO emphasises the role of public health 
services in LLIN implementation, it does not exclude the involvement of the private sector which 
have played and will continue to play a complementary role in implementing LLIN interventions. 
Quantifying Sources of LLIN Demand 
The 2007 WHO position statement on expanded coverage and universal access to LLINs for all 
people at risk of malaria (World Health Organization Global Malaria Programme, 2007) coupled 
with the UN Population Division projections for population growth (United Nations, 2017), defines 
a much larger target market from that agreed on in 2000. The estimated number of LLINs 
required to achieve coverage targets in 40 sub-Saharan African countries between 2013 and 
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2016 was 806 million (Paintain et al., 2013), with a forecasted 217m LLINs needed for 2017(Roll 
Back Malaria, 20141).  
The Alliance for Malaria Prevention’s Net Mapping Project (NMP) surveys every LLIN 
manufacturer each quarter and quantifies the number of nets that have been delivered to each 
country reporting on a worldwide, country and regional level. Our analysis of NMP data shows 
that reported net sales peaked at over 200 million in 2014 (Figure 2). The African region 
dominates global reported net sales, with the West and East African regions contributing the 
largest share within Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Outside of SSA, the largest percentage of nets 
going to countries in the rest of the world (ROW) between 2009 and 2017 went to India, 
Indonesia and Myanmar.  
NMP data shows the dominance of donors who are responsible for more than 99% of global 
demand for LLINs in 2015, 2016 and so far in 2017. The Global Fund (GF) remains the biggest 
purchaser of LLINs with 62% in 2015, 45% in 2016 and 65% in 2017(to date). The US 
Governments’ Presidents Malaria Initiative (PMI) was the second largest donor, but has now 
been matched by “other donors”. Private demand accounts for less than 1%; 0.17% in 2015 
which increased to 0.44% in 2016 but for quarters 1 and 2 of 2017 has decreased to 0.11%.  
Figure 2. Net Sales by Region as Reported to Net Mapping Project 2004-2017 
 
Source: Data from Netmapping project, figure: Authors. Regions: WARN = West Africa; SARN = 
Southern Africa; EARN = East Africa; CARN = Central Africa; ROW = Rest of World. Note. ROW data 
reporting commences in in 2009. 2017 data for Q1 and Q2 only.  
                                                 
1 These estimates used to be updated regularly by Roll Back Malaria, however we were unable to find 
recent estimates, possibly due to the recent changes to the Roll Back Malaria Partnership which may 
have led to changes in responsibility for providing and disseminating these estimates. 
9 
Figure 3 LLIN supply by donor 
 
Source: Data obtained from the Net Mapping Project, figure Authors. 
http://allianceformalariaprevention.com/working-groups/net-mapping-project/ 
The LLIN market could be described as a monopsony due to the dominance of a single major 
donor, the Global Fund, in the purchase of global LLINs. Over recent years procurement of LLINs 
has become more centralised often passing through Global Funds Pooled Mechanism. While this 
has several benefits including the ability to negotiate lower prices, pooled procurement can 
potentially disenfranchise national disease control programmes and may limit choice of locally 
specific and appropriate products. Ultimately the dominance of a single powerful buyer may be 
reducing the variety of products being produced, and the downward pressure on prices may at 
some point reduce the quality and desirability of nets for example by making them smaller or of 
rougher yarn. There is a potential price quality and price variety trade off in the LLIN market, both 
of which may ultimately reduce LLIN utilisation once products are distributed.  
Household Demand 
Over the past two decades many households in Africa have become familiar with LLIN 
technology and it could be argued that the free distribution of LLINs has sensitised consumers to 
the product, creating a large potential market for the private sector. Data shows that the 
proportion of households with sufficient ITNs for all household members was 42% in 2015; well 
below universal coverage target (100%). It is estimated that 53% of the population at risk in SSA 
slept under an ITN in 2015, an increase from 5% in 2005 and from 30% in 2010 (World Health 
Organization, 2016). Even in countries that report high coverage levels, evidence suggests that 
there are not enough nets to cover all household members, that coverage is inequitable both 
between and within households, and use of LLINs is inconsistent (PMI, 2016). Further challenges 
include supporting delivery costs for LLINs and maintaining coverage as nets become lost or 
damaged and/or the household increases. However, the biggest constraint to LLIN/ITN use is 
access (i.e. not having any or enough to cover all family members). In other words, demand for 
LLINs outstrips the supply.   
The retail market potentially provides households with options for replacing or increasing the 
number of nets they own with products that best fit their needs by supplying a variety of net 
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shapes, sizes and colours. Results from a recent choice experiment conducted in Tanzania 
exploring private demand for nets suggest that there is private demand and this could potentially 
supplement future coverage campaigns (Gingrich, Ricotta, Kahwa, Kahabuka, & Koenker, 2017). 
A key factor influencing demand was whether a participant’s household currently owned 
sufficient nets for all members, with rural participants showing lower net coverage and greater 
demand than urban participants. Both poor and less poor households showed strong evidence of 
making purchase decisions based on more than price alone. Willingness-to-pay varied for 
different attributes such as rectangular shape, large size and insecticide treatment and the 
impact of price on demand was negative but small. The authors suggest that net manufacturers 
and retailers should advertise and promote consumers’ preferred net attributes to improve sales 
and further expand net access and coverage. In addition, policy makers should consider making 
credit available for interested buyers. 
However, it is not clear whether there is a significant market for unsubsidised LLINs outside of 
urban areas (Koenker et al., 2013). Internationally recognised WHOPES-recommended LLINs 
are available on the Tanzanian commercial market in small quantities but these remain an 
insignificant portion of LLINs available in country. In addition to this there are concerns over fake 
LLINs and it would be virtually impossible for consumers to be sure that they had purchased a 
real LLIN as the insecticide is invisible and has no odour.  
A new DFID funded project in Ghana – the Private Sector Malaria Project 
(www.privatesectormalaria.org/)– will investigate consumer preferences for different LLIN 
attributes, and also conduct retail audits to establish what nets are available in commercial 
outlets. The ultimate aim of this project is to investigate the feasibility of using commercial 
markets to increase access to LLINs. 
Demand for Other Vector Control Interventions 
The focus of this report is LLINs, although other preventative measures may need to be 
considered in the context of LLINs. For example, the WHO Elimination Framework recommends 
that all countries should aim to have the capacity to deploy Indoor Residual Spraying(IRS) on top 
of LLINs/ITNs but that the introduction of IRS should not be used to compensate for poor 
coverage of LLINs/ITNs (World Health Organization, 2017). A Cochrane Review is currently 
being conducted to evaluate whether IRS in combination with LLINs/ITNs causes an additional 
reduction to malaria transmission versus LLINs/ITNs alone (Choi, Pryce, & Garner, 2017). Global 
demand for IRS is dominated by financing from the US Government Presidents Malaria Initiative 
with notable involvement of private sector players in Bioko Island (Marathon Oil) and Ghana 
(Ashanti Gold). Households also invest significantly in mosquito control products such as coils, 
indoor sprays and repellents (e.g. McElroy et al. 2009) demonstrating a willingness and ability to 
pay for protection from mosquitoes in the absence of any public sector involvement in the 
market. More recently there has been a rise in interest in the role of housing improvements in 
providing protection against disease vectors which opens up potentially interesting avenues for 
private sector engagement (Tusting et al 2017). Further investigation into these alternative vector 
control interventions is beyond scope of this report.  
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4. LLIN Supply Side: Production 
Competition and Market Share 
The donor financed LLIN commodity market was estimated to be worth US$1billion in 2014 
(World Health Organization, 2015). Information on market share by individual producers is 
commercially sensitive and therefore not readily available. However, our analysis of data from 
the Global Fund Price Quantity Reporting database gives an indication of market share by 
manufacturer. Reporting to this database is voluntary and although the GF is the biggest 
purchaser of LLINs, crudely comparing the data from the AMP project with the data in the GF 
PQR database it appears that the PQR data only represents about 10% of LLIN sales in 2014 
and 2015. However, GF PQR provides detailed information on net suppliers/manufacturers, 
prices and country. We used GF PQR data to examine the number of suppliers of LLINs and 
their share of the market. These data seem to illustrate a trend for both an increasing number of 
suppliers and a more equal share of the market over time. However, we cannot draw firm 
conclusions due to the incomplete nature of these data (Figure 4 and Annex 1). The AMP net 
mapping data is deliberately anonymised so that it is not possible to ascertain market share by 
manufacturers. Given the sums of donor funds invested in this market, the lack of transparency is 
a concern.  
A further consideration is that with such a large donor market, where a single transaction can be 
worth millions of dollars, there is clearly the potential for the private sector to focus on a few high-
volume transactions with donors, rather than try and establish complex and risky supply chains in 
Africa where sales volumes may be low. The private sector can utilise its pre-existing retail 
networks, as A to Z Textile Mills did during Tanzanian National Voucher Scheme (TNVS) 
(Kramer et al., 2017). However, where this pre-existing network does not already exist, it can be 
difficult to build, especially in hard-to-reach areas as was the case for BestNet in the TNVS. The 
question is whether the private sector would be more willing to invest in retail supply chains if the 
donor market was to shrink, or if they would simply walk away from LLIN production all together.  
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Figure 4 Market share by LLIN manufacturer as reported to Global Fund PQR database 
 
Legend: Colours represent different manufactures, too many to show clearly on figure. Blue Represents 
Vestergaard Group which is the biggest supplier. More detailed summaries by year shown in Annex 1 
Source: Authors analysis of LLIN Market share by supplier, data obtained from Global Fund Price Quantity 
Reporting database Transaction Summary..[https://bip2-ext.theglobalfund.org/analytics/saw.dll?Dashboard] 
Accessed 13/07/2017.  
LLIN prices 
The GF PQR data is more reliable in illustrating a downward trend in unit prices of LLINs (Figure 
5). The data are supported by information from UNICEF which also shows that LLIN prices have 
fallen from $4.36 in 2006, to $1.70-2.19 in 2016 (range due to number of suppliers). This fall in 
prices has clearly enabled donor budgets to stretch further, but concerns have been raised about 
the impact of this downward price pressure on the quantity and size of LLINs, which may 
ultimately impact on use by households. On the other hand, the low prices and possible 
perceived inferiority of donor funded free nets may create an opportunity for higher quality nets to 
be sold via the commercial retail sector directly to country level to those who can afford them.  
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Figure 5 Price per LLIN for different LLIN brands 2003 – 2017, US$ as reported to GF PQR database 
 
Legend: Colours represent different LLIN products, too many to show clearly on figure.  
Source: Authors analysis of LLIN price data obtained from Global Fund Price Quantity Reporting database 
Transaction Summary [https://bip2-ext.theglobalfund.org/analytics/saw.dll?Dashboard] Accessed 13/07/2017.  
Market Failures 
Insecticide Resistance 
Currently there is only one type of insecticide (pyrethroid) being used on LLINs. It is possible that 
widespread use of pyrethroid LLINs is in part responsible for increasing insecticide resistance in 
mosquitos, thus resistance could be a negative externality of LLIN use.  With insecticide 
resistance affecting an increasing number of malaria-endemic countries and threatening the 
effectiveness of pyrethroid LLINs, there is an increasing urgency to develop and implement 
alternative tools that control these resistant populations. One option is to provide access to ‘next-
generation LLINs’ treated with two or more insecticides (combination LLINs) or with an 
insecticide and the synergist piperonyl butoxide (PBO LLINs). Two PBO LLINs (PermaNet© 3.0 
and Olyset Plus©) are currently available on the market after receiving WHOPES interim 
approval under the standard LLIN categorisation in 2008 and 2012, respectively (World Health 
Organization, 2009, 2012). Recommendations for evaluating next-generation nets have recently 
been published (World Health Organization, 2014), however, at the time of writing there is no 
clear WHO recommendation on how these nets might potentially be used to control resistant 
mosquitoes. The product manufactures claim this lack of clear policy recommendation 
recognising the potential additional benefit of these products (and therefore may support a higher 
price than for standard LLINs) is a disincentive to innovation. Furthermore, a study conducted in 
Burkina Faso showed that “a clear WHO recommendation and adequate financing will be key to 
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accelerate access to next-generation LLINs” (Tesfazghi et al., 2016). This study highlights the 
need for increased domestic funding to reduce donor dependence and increase the power of 
policy-makers in Burkina Faso to choose appropriate interventions for their setting but recognises 
the potential need for high-level global subsidies to improve the availability and affordability of 
high quality products that have a higher unit cost (Tesfazghi et al., 2016) 
Lack of Incentive to Innovate 
The lack of commercial incentives to adequately stimulate the research, development and 
innovation required to develop novel insecticides and vector control tools including LLINs, IRS 
and other approaches has been recognised. In 2005 the Innovative Vector Control Consortium 
(IVCC) was established with a US$50 million grant from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. It 
is a product development partnership whose aim is to stimulate industry and academia to 
develop new tools to manage insect disease vectors. Since 2005 IVCC has received additional 
funding from UK, Swiss and American tax payers, representing a public subsidy to vector control. 
So far, investments in malaria research via IVCC and research initiatives have resulted in a 
plethora of new approaches to control disease vectors (Killeen et al 2017). Those which involve 
the use of pesticides include; various new types of mosquito net which are currently under review 
for approval by WHO and notably one re-purposed non-pyrethroid insecticide, Actellic CS, that 
can be used to give long lasting protection via indoor residual spraying (IRS).  
Barriers to Entry, Monopoly and Regulation 
There are barriers to entry for private sector manufacturers wanting to enter the LLIN market. 
Alongside the usual issues of cost and risk of investing in factories, capital equipment and labour, 
potential entrants need to ensure that their products meet the required quality standards and 
obtain relevant WHO approval in order to enter the large donor driven LLIN market. Prior to 
October 2016 the WHO Pesticide Evaluation Scheme (WHOPES) was responsible for 
establishing guidelines for safety and efficacy and review and recommendation of LLIN products. 
It has become a gold standard because donors purchase WHOPES-recommended LLINs almost 
exclusively. Between 2001 and 2006, only two products received a WHOPES recommendation, 
creating an effective duopoly. Between 2004 and 2006, Vestergaard-Frandsen and Sumitomo 
Chemical were awarded the vast majority of government contracts for net distribution. Sumitomo 
sold about 30-million Olysets, and Vestergaard sold more than 100 million PermaNets2. As of 
2017 there are there are 19 WHOPES approved LLINs made by 14 different manufacturers 
(Table 1). 
Another noticeable issue is that except for A-Z factory in Tanzania, none of the WHOPES 
approved LLINs are manufactured in Africa. Most production takes place in Asia. Tanzania is 
unique in that Sumitomo Chemical in Japan transferred in 2003 its LLIN (Olyset®) manufacturing 
technology to A to Z Textile Mills Ltd in Arusha, Tanzania, a local producer already engaged in 
the manufacturing of bed nets, as a royalty-free transfer (Gradl, 2013). Transfer of LLIN 
production to endemic countries potentially creates economic benefits in the form of tax revenues 
and jobs which may encourage domestic governments to support scale up of LLINs with 
domestic resources (Tesfazghi et al 2016). However, experts consulted for this review suggested 
that the cost of establishing LLIN production capacity in Tanzania, the comparative advantage of 
                                                 
2 http://www.fightingmalaria.org/issues/insecticide-treated-nets-5.html. Accessed 25/07/2015 
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Asia over African in supporting manufacturing and the limited return on the investment meant 
that this is unlikely to be reproduced in other countries. Others suggested that there may be a 
role for transferring the stitching of nets to Africa using imported LLIN materials, however there 
are issues related to taxes and tariffs on imported netting that would need to be addressed to 
make this economically feasible.  
Table 1 WHOPES approved LLIN products as of June 2017 
Product Name Product description Manufacturer Recom
mendati
on 
DawaPlus 2.0 Deltamethrin coated on polyester Tana Netting Interim 
DawaPlus 3.0 Combination of deltamethrin coated on 
polyester (side panels),and deltamethrin + PBO 
incorporated into polyethylene (roof) and 
deltamethrin + PBO incorporated into 
polyethylene (roof) 
Tana Netting Interim 
DawaPlus4.0 Deltamethrin + PBO incorporated into 
polyethylene 
Tana Netting Interim 
Duranet Alpha-cypermethrin incorporated into 
polyethylene 
Duranet LLIN Full 
Interceptor Alpha-cypermethrin coated on polyester BASF Full 
Interceptor G2 Alpha-cypermethrin and chlorfenapyr coated 
on polyester 
BASF Interim 
LifeNet Deltamethrin incorporated into polypropylene Bayer Interim 
MAGNet Alpha-cypermethrin incorporated into 
polyethylene 
V. K. A Polymers 
LTD 
Full 
MiraNet Alpha-cypermethrin incorporated into 
polyethylene 
A - Z Textile Mills 
Tanzania 
Interim 
Olyset Net Permethrin incorporated into polyethylene Sumitomo 
Chemical 
Company 
Full 
Olyset Plus Permethrin + PBO incorporated into 
polyethylene 
Sumitomo 
Chemical 
Company 
Interim 
Panda Net 2.0 Deltamethrin incorporated into polyethylene Life Ideas Textiles, 
China 
Interim 
Permanet 2.0 Deltamethrin coated on polyester Vestergaard 
Frandsen 
Full 
Permanet 3.0 Combination of deltamethrin coated on 
polyester with strengthened border (side 
panels), and deltamethrin + PBO incorporated 
into polyethylene (roof) 
Vestergaard 
Frandsen 
Interim 
Royal Sentry Alpha-cypermethrin incorporated into 
polyethylene 
Disease Control 
Technologies Ltd 
Full 
SafeNet Alpha-cypermethrin coated on polyester Mainpol GmbH Full 
Veeralin Alpha-cypermethrin + PBO incorporated into 
polyethylene 
Vector Control 
Innovations Pvt 
Ltd, India 
Interim 
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Yahe Deltamethrin coated on polyester Fujian Yamei 
Industry, China 
Interim 
Yorkool Deltamethrin coated on polyester Yorkool 
International Co., 
Ltd. 
Full 
Source: http://www.who.int/whopes/Long-lasting_insecticidal_nets_June_2017.pdf?ua=1 
Following criticism about the time taken by WHOPES to review submissions, the process of 
obtaining WHO approval for vector control products, including LLINs, has recently been changed 
to streamline and accelerate the process. The WHOPES process is currently being phased out, 
though products already under review will remain under the WHOPES process and products with 
existing WHOPES approvals will be converted to pre-qualification (PQ) upon submission of a 
satisfactory conversion package, factory standards and product quality checks over the next five 
years. Vector control products submitted for review after October 2016 will be subject to a new 
process. The process is different depending on whether a product is deemed to belong to a 
product class with a product claim for which a WHO policy recommendation has been issued or 
not. If it does (e.g. it a pyrethroid LLIN) then it will enter the prequalification pathway which 
requires submission of a product dossier which includes data and information to support the 
safety, efficacy, and quality requirements appropriate to the product type and generated 
according to Good Laboratory Practices (GLP) and appropriate Quality Management System 
(QMS). This dossier is reviewed and if complete the dossier will be reviewed by an expert panel 
and manufacturing facilities will be inspected to ensure compliance with WHO quality standards. 
If the panel is satisfied and the required factory standards are met, then it will be listed on the 
WHO PQ website (http://www.who.int/pq-vector-control/en/) and can be procured using UN 
funds.  
The process for products which are not deemed to belong to a class that already has WHO 
policy recommendation is managed by the WHO Vector Control Advisory Group (VCAG). VCAG 
guides innovators in data and documentation requirements, and advises WHO on the public 
health value of new tools, technologies and approaches. This advisory group was jointly 
established by the Global Malaria Programme and the Department of Control of Neglected 
Tropical Diseases. Products belonging to a class and/or having a product claim (or claims) for 
which there is no applicable WHO policy recommendation will be referred to VCAG. For each 
new product class or variant not yet recognized by WHO and for which there is no WHO policy 
recommendation (1) , VCAG will provide a recommendation to WHO on the evidence required to 
substantiate the claim(s) and will advise on the evaluation methods needed to generate these 
data. VCAG’s role will depend on how advanced the evidence is to support a new vector control 
tool, technology or approach. These products are assessed for their potential public health value, 
which will require epidemiological data on their protective efficacy against infection and/or 
disease. This implies the need for data from large scale implementation and/or randomised 
control trials. If this is the case the process is likely to take upwards of 2-3 years to gather 
evidence required by VCAG to make a recommendation to WHO. VCAG is also responsible for 
assessing products which are classed as those exhibiting variations of claims for an existing 
product class for example LLINs that claim to control insecticide resistant mosquitoes.  Further 
details of the evaluation process for vector control products can be found in this WHO 
information note (WHO, 2017).  
There are two key market concerns related to the process for approving new vector control tools, 
which includes modified LLINS that are likely to affect the private sector involvement in the 
production of LLINs. The first is about the cost and time required to bring new technologies to 
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market which under the new process must be met by manufacturers of the product. This process 
inevitably involves a risk that the product will fail meaning a loss of sunk investment costs. Even 
if a product is proven to be effective, there is still uncertainty about the demand for the products 
which may be dependent on donor funding that is subject to political uncertainty in donor 
countries and/or on uncertain consumer demand. The other issue is that under the new model, 
innovators bear the cost and risk of failure, but once a product has a proven claim and WHO 
recommendation, other manufacturers can enter the market via the quicker and less risky PQ 
process. This erodes the potential gains to be made from innovation and encourages “free riders” 
to produce so-called copycat or “me too” products with lower cost and less risk which creates the 
potential to undercut the innovators product. While lower costs are a potentially good outcome, 
challenges such as insecticide resistance and the need to provide a variety of products that 
respond to changing vector behaviour and consumer tastes and preferences also require 
innovation.  
There is an apparent trade off here between greater competition leading to lower product prices 
that in turn translate to higher numbers of LLINs for a given budget on the one hand, and less 
competition leading to higher product prices and fewer LLINs for a given budget. Furthermore, 
the incentive to innovate is potentially reduced in a market where the returns generated by 
innovation are lower due to low prices and subject to an increased risk of being competed away 
by new market entrants, so lower barriers to entry may inadvertently supress product innovation.   
5. LLIN Supply Side: Distribution 
Catch-up and Keep-up LLIN distribution 
Long-term protection with LLINs is dependent on achieving and maintaining high coverage of the 
overall population. Distribution requires two integrated strategies: (1) a ‘catch-up’ strategy that 
allows a fast increase in the coverage of LLINs in the country, and which is usually achieved by 
free mass distribution campaigns; and (2) a ‘keep-up’ strategy to maintain a high net coverage 
through the continuous provision of nets which can involve provision through health facilities, 
routine antenatal care or immunization services, schools and the private sector. The keep-up 
strategy needs to run in parallel with catch-up campaigns owing to coverage gaps through net 
deterioration, loss of nets and population growth. LLINs also need replacing every three years. 
Both strategies should be supported by behaviour change communication campaigns (Roll Back 
Malaria, 2012). 
In Africa, the most common catch-up strategy at present involves mass procurement of LLINs by 
African governments using donor finances (notably the Global Fund) and free-at-the-point-of-
delivery distribution to end users by the National Malaria Control Programme (NMCP) and 
partners through regular (three years) campaigns. Keep-up strategies tend to have similar 
procurement and financing, with distribution being coordinated by NMCPs using systems such as 
antenatal care, expanded programme on immunisation or various community based models (e.g. 
community health workers or volunteers). 
In some contexts, retreatment programmes are still important for untreated bednets, particularly 
in Vietnam where donors have supplied untreated bednets. However, in Africa, LLIN technology 
dominates.    
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Public and Private Sector Distribution channels 
To estimate the contribution of different distribution systems to net coverage we reviewed recent 
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) and Malaria Indicator Survey (MIS) reports for selected 
African countries: Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda. We also included the only 
South East Asian country that we could obtain data for, Myanmar. Conducting a separate 
analysis for rural and urban areas showed that in SSA the majority of people with nets got them 
from campaigns with commercial sources of nets being lower. Commercial sources of net were 
generally higher urban areas, Tanzania (54%), Kenya (37%) and 23% in Uganda. Almost all the 
urban nets in Myanmar were from commercial sources (93.5%) with 76% coming from 
commercial sources in rural areas. Two countries had more than one survey. In Nigeria the 
commercial source of net declined between surveys, in Ghana commercial sources of net were 
not classified separately in the data. These data have to be interpreted with caution as surveys 
only provide a snapshot, and without contextual information notably on the timing of the data 
collection in relation to any mass distribution campaigns we cannot understand the dynamics of 
sources of nets. Also it’s not clear if these nets are untreated nets, ITNs and LLINs which may 
well vary between distribution systems.  
Figure 6 Source of LLINs/ITNS from selected MIS and DHS survey reports Rural (top) and Urban (bottom)  
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Source: Data extracted by authors from MIS (http://www.malariasurveys.org/) and DHS reports. 
(http://www.dhsprogram.com/publications/publication-search.cfm?type=5) 
 
Lessons from South East Asia 
While the private sector in Asia plays a bigger role in distributing mosquito nets than it does in 
Africa, there are many important reasons for this and differences between Asia and Africa which 
may make it difficult to draw any useful lessons. Historically nets were widely used in Asia before 
the 1990s/2000s scale up so the private sector was already there delivering nets at scale. In 
contrast in many parts of Africa there was no tradition of net use prior to public net distribution. 
The main policy for malaria control in most Asian countries is vector control, but frequency of 
mass campaign distribution is a lot less than in Africa and donor funded distribution of nets in 
Asia has been on a much smaller scale than in Africa, hence the potential for crowding out of the 
private sector has been far less. Also, countries like Viet Nam continue to be involved in 
community retreatment of nets, which is seldom found in Africa after 2005 primarily due to 
challenges with feasibility of conducting retreatment. In Myanmar, implementation strategies 
include free delivery of LLINs and free treatment of mosquito nets already in use before the start 
of the peak transmission season (Liu et al 2015). The fact that treatment of nets is feasible in 
Asia, means that consumers can purchase lower priced untreated nets and the public sector can 
focus on paying for insecticide to turn these products into a public health intervention. The 
economic context is also very different, with Asian countries generally being wealthier than 
African ones making affordability less of a constraint. At the same time since most nets are 
manufactured in Asia, the costs of supplying the Asian market are lower. If any lesson can be 
drawn from Asia, it is probably that in parts of Africa where there is a culture of net use, and 
where affordability is not a challenge (perhaps urban areas and/or more wealthy countries) 
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people will purchase nets from the private sector. However, given that retreatment programmes 
are unlikely to be feasible in these contexts, that consumers may not be willing to pay a premium 
for LLINs and/or are at risk of being sold fake LLINs, it is not clear how to turn the purchase of 
nets into a public health good.  
Targeted Subsidies 
While free market systems (with or without donor support) can achieve some levels of net 
coverage, this tends to be skewed towards wealthier and urban populations. In the 1990s debate 
was hot about whether LLINs should be fully or partially subsidised and whether and how 
subsidies should be targeted. On the one hand those in favour of a full subsidy said that it was 
unfair and inequitable for the world’s poorest people to be asked to contribute to the cost, 
whereas those in favour of a partial subsidy were concerned about sustainability. They feared 
that fully subsidised products would crowd-out the private sector which in some countries had 
been effectively distributing untreated bed nets without public subsidy, and that over the long 
term, donor fatigue would lead to a decline in subsidised net distribution and destruction of 
private distribution. Several demand side voucher schemes were implemented to provide a way 
of subsidising the price paid by consumers (often pregnant women and children) without 
bypassing (crowding out) the private sector distribution mechanism. The most well-known of 
these schemes, the Tanzanian National Voucher Scheme was launched in 2004. Here we briefly 
describe the voucher scheme adopted in Tanzania, and the challenges this scheme faced, and 
the voucher scheme that was planned to be adopted in Ghana and enabling differences between 
the two countries.   
Tanzanian National Voucher Scheme 
The Tanzanian National Voucher Scheme (TNVS) represents one of the largest and most 
enduring keep-up programmes targeting pregnant women and young children in any endemic 
country and the only national level voucher scheme to distribute nets. The TNVS started in 
October 2004 and reached national scale by in 2006. The TNVS was a public-private partnership 
(PPP) under the leadership of the Ministry of Health, and included multilateral and bilateral 
development partners, NGOs, academic institutions, mosquito net manufacturers, wholesalers 
and retailers. Funding for the programme was provided by The Global Fund from 2003 to 2011, 
USAID (through PMI) from 2006 to 2013 and DFID from 2011 to 2014.  
From October 2004 to mid-2014 the TNVS was the key distribution mechanism under the 
National Insecticide Treated Nets (NATNETS) Programme to increase access to and use of ITNs 
and from 2009 LLINs amongst pregnant women and young children. These two target groups 
were issued with a discount voucher when attending a reproductive and child health facility. The 
vouchers could then be exchanged for an ITN or LLIN at a participating retail outlet at a greatly 
reduced price. The initial aim was to increase coverage of ITNs to 60% amongst pregnant 
women and infants and to develop a strong commercial supply chain for nets supplemented by 
subsidised sales to target population. In 2007 the TNVS introduced two changes to its operations 
by increasing the amount to 3250 TSh (which only partly compensated for higher retail ITN 
prices, arising in part from oil price increases) and adding a new voucher for infants. In 2008, the 
NMCP launched a national ‘catch-up’ campaign to distribute free LLINs to all children under 5 
years old. In 2014, the TNVS closed due to the end of donor funding, exposure of fraudulent 
activities in the e-voucher mechanism by some clinic and retail staff and over issuing of infant 
vouchers, contrary to policy. The TNVS provided the framework for a commercial retail market 
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but since the programme was closed there has been limited incentive for retailers to stock LLINs. 
Cheaper, untreated nets are still widely available in urban and peri-urban areas – so there is still 
a demand if the price is right.  
Kramer et al. 2017 examined the effectiveness and equity of the TNVS as the programme 
evolved (Kramer et al., 2017). The effectiveness of the TNVS was a function of several 
interdependent factors including, the supply chain of vouchers through the public health system; 
the supply chain of nets in the commercial sector; the demand for nets from voucher recipients; 
management and risk mitigation measures; and the influence of the global and donor objectives. 
The programme reached most beneficiaries with vouchers and provided 1.2 million to 1.8 million 
highly subsidised LLINs per year. Approximately 30% of all (long lasting) insecticide treated nets 
between 2004 and 2014 were distributed through TNVS. The authors hail the TNVS as “a 
unique, innovative and globally influential programme that stimulated strategic thinking about 
effectively and equitably distributing ITNs, and contributed directly to the evolution of global LLIN 
policy”. The TNVS maintained for some years a nationwide retail network which formed the 
downstream end of the LLIN supply chain but was unable to strengthen the commercial supply 
chain for nets supplemented by subsidised sales to target populations. In spite of a decade of 
donor funding and three distinct programme design models, a commercial market for LLINs was 
never established in Tanzania for multiple interconnected reasons including: challenges of 
establishing a retail network in hard-to-reach areas; poor mobile phone connectivity which 
hampered enrolment of retailers to the e-voucher scheme;, LLIN stock outs; and the high retail 
price of LLINs coupled with low profit margins for retailers (Kramer et al., 2017).  
Reliance on external funding made the TNVS vulnerable in several ways (Kramer et al., 2017). 
Key changes in global malaria policy from 60% coverage amongst pregnant women and infants 
with ITNs to free universal coverage with LLINs removed (donor) focus on the private sector as a 
distributor (Kramer et al., 2017). This policy change also narrowed the scope for private sector 
players in the production of nets, as only the ones who had the technology to produce LLINs (as 
opposed to ITNs) could participate in the donor funded net market. This meant that Tanzania had 
a reliable domestic supplier of LLINs, which transpired to be important for multiple reasons: 
1. It brought with it an established wholesale/retail supply chain to get nets to urban, and 
peri urban areas successfully (less well to rural hard-to-reach areas) thus facilitating the 
voucher scheme with a distribution chain (Gradl, 2013). 
2. The domestic LLIN manufacturer endured after a new international entrant (NetProtect®, 
made by BestNet) to the market failed to establish adequate distribution networks, and 
then had its WHOPES recommendation revoked as the required field studies were found 
not to comply with the WHO requirement for testing and evaluation of LLINs (Gradl, 
2013). 
3. The domestic manufacture of LLINs provided powerful local champions who helped drive 
the agenda, and the fact that there were domestic economic returns to the Tanzanian 
government in the form of jobs and tax revenues which helped to provide an enabling 
environment to continue to support this public private model even against the direction of 
global policy.  
The sustainability of A to Z’s Olyset® production was challenged by the complex linkages 
between donors, governments, companies, and end-users. A to Z found itself in a position where 
the Olyset® nets had to compete with less effective and less expensive LLINs manufactured in 
Asia that had only achieved “interim” WHOPES certification (Brigham and Women's Hospital, 
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April 2011). Additionally, donors’ long-established shipping and distribution networks for bed nets 
manufactured in Asia were preventing A to Z from capitalizing on its relative proximity to most of 
the world’s malarious regions. Frustratingly, donors and development organizations (bilateral and 
multilateral) required bed net manufacturers to quote prices exclusive of distribution and delivery 
costs, negating the advantage of A to Z’s local manufacture (Brigham and Women's Hospital, 
April 2011). 
The PPP model harnessed by the TNVS was more successful in its earliest phase i.e. when 
distributing vouchers for ITNs, where there were multiple suppliers and prices were relatively low 
(before universal free access to LLINs policy goal). Introduction of LLINs to the TNVS with the 
subsequent reduction in the number of producers and increase in costs and prices, contributed to 
a much lower coverage and uptake of the programme. Equity of access to LLINs and a viable 
private market was not achieved but the programme did contribute significantly to “keep up” of 
LLIN coverage by harnessing the private sector, especially in terms of retail supply chains. 
Kramer et al (2017) suggest lessons learned from the programme include:  
• The need to simultaneously address supply side (number of suppliers, reach of 
supply chain, quality standard of product) and demand side (access, affordability and 
availability of variety of nets to meet diverse demands) which results in a complex 
programme design;  
• The challenges of preventing fraud and providing donors reassurance that funds are 
being used for their intended purpose. 
• Vulnerability caused by changing donor priorities. 
Ghanaian Voucher Scheme 
In Ghana, national-scale implementation of vouchers never progressed beyond discussion and 
piloting towards formulation of policy; the approach was replaced by mass distribution campaigns 
with less dependency on or integration with the health system. By 2011, Ghana entered a phase 
with no publicly support continuous delivery system for ITNs. A study reported in 2012 found that 
contextual factors which provided an enabling environment for the voucher scheme in Tanzania 
did not do so in Ghana. The voucher scheme was never seen as an appropriate national 
strategy, other delivery systems were not complementary and the private sector was under-
developed (de Savigny et al., 2012). The engagement and consensus building among all 
stakeholders and public sector support of the private sector in Tanzania was an enabling 
difference to Ghana which suffered competition from delivery systems (de Savigny et al., 2012). 
Key messages from this paper include: 
• Contextual requirements for the success of an intervention should be considered before 
an intervention is picked from one context and piloted in another.  
• Stakeholder engagement and management is critical for ownership and sustained 
integration of the intervention in the system. 
• Alignment of partners and efforts behind a single delivery strategy for an intervention 
results in less complexity and unpredictability in how the system will react. 
(de Savigny et al., 2012)  
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6. Lessons and Key Questions 
There appears to be a renewed interest in engaging, expanding and diversifying the private 
sector’s role in the production and distribution of LLINs. This is in part due to the shortfall in 
funding required to provide universal coverage of LLINs and the decline in donor funding of 
malaria that we have seen over the past years. It is also a question that was widely researched 
and debated 10-15 years ago, when concerns over financing, equity and sustainability of ITN 
coverage were also highly topical. While much of the empirical evidence from this time will be 
irrelevant now, the key lessons remain highly relevant. For example, in 2005, Magesa et al. 
describe Tanzania’s experience in promoting the development of a commercial sector for 
insecticide-treated nets; before the global policy of universal coverage with LLINs (Magesa et al., 
2005). The authors suggest that neither the public sector nor the commercial sector alone can 
achieve universal coverage with mosquito nets, but that the best way forward is a well-
coordinated partnership among all mosquito net stakeholders based on increased demand and 
supply, a vibrant commercial sector, and a targeted subsidy scheme for those most at risk 
(Magesa et al., 2005). To create and sustain this partnership, a shared vision is required along 
with a number of enabling factors including: (1) removal of any form of taxation; (2) favourable 
insecticide regularity conditions; (3) net quality control issues; (4) generic demand creation by the 
public sector; and (5) equity of access (Magesa et al., 2005). 
Household demand is a key factor influencing the choice of delivery strategy. It is not clear 
whether there is a significant market for unsubsidised LLINs outside urban areas. Internationally 
recognised WHOPES-recommended LLINs are available on the Tanzanian commercial market in 
small quantities but these remain an insignificant portion of the LLINs available in country 
(Koenker et al., 2013). This is likely to be due to affordability and a lack of awareness about the 
difference between nets and LLINs. However, it could also suggest that free or highly subsided 
LLINs dampen demand for commercial nets. Further research is required to determine whether it 
is possible to combine free nets delivered through mass campaigns with a system which relies 
on the commercial sector to distribute nets, and to determine whether the coverage achieved 
through this combined system is more sustainable than that which any one system can achieve 
on its own. 
A recently launched DFID funded project, the Private Sector Malaria Prevention (PSMP) project 
(previously mentioned) aims to find out the extent to which private sector can be encouraged to 
increase participating in financing and delivery of malaria control in Ghana by focusing on three 
main areas: retail supply chain and demand creation, workplace programs and advocacy. The 
CCP are currently conducting a market analysis in Ghana and Tanzania looking at consumer 
preferences, willingness to pay, market size and other factors that they will share with 
international bed net manufacturers. This project will provide useful up to date data to 
supplement the historical ITN and net market analyses that exist.  
Quantifying the economic burden of malaria may convince businesses that it is economically 
beneficial to invest in malaria control, generating additional financing.  A study in Ghana found 
that businesses in Ghana lost about US$6.58 million to malaria in 2014, 90 % of which were 
direct costs. A total of 3913 workdays were lost due to malaria in firms in the study sample during 
the period 2012–2014. Importantly, 93% of business leaders expressed the need for private 
sector investment in malaria control in Ghana; a country where donor funds are reducing due to 
the country’s status as a lower-middle income country (Nonvignon et al., 2016).  
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The recent demise of the longest running targeted subsidy scheme in Tanzania is a clear set 
back in efforts to creatively engage the private sector in the supply of affordable and high quality 
mosquito nets. However, it also provides important lessons on how to conduct these 
programmes should appetite for them return. The main lesson seems to be that any public 
private partnership will require strong management and robust strategies to prevent abuse, this 
will cost money to achieve and will need to be maintained. Engaging the private sector should 
not be seen as a way to reduce the costs of protecting people with LLINs, but rather as an 
opportunity to increase coverage, reduce inefficiencies and stimulate innovation in new effective 
products that consumers demand and are willing to pay for. But there is a balancing act between 
supporting the existing private sector players, and ensuring that barriers to entry for new players 
are kept low to improve competition. This is a complex public policy challenge. 
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8. Annexes 
Annex 1. Analysis of LLIN market share using data reported to the 
Global Fund Price Quantity Reporting database 
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Figure 7 LLIN Market share by supplier, Quantity of nets 2013 (top), 2014 (middle) and 2015 (bottom) as reported 
to Global Fund Price Quantity Reporting database Transaction Summary..[https://bip2-
ext.theglobalfund.org/analytics/saw.dll?Dashboard] Accessed 13/07/2017. Source of figure, Authors 
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Figure 8 LLIN Market share by supplier and expenditure (US$) of nets 2013 (top), 2014 (middle) and 2015 
(bottom) as reported to Global Fund Price Quantity Reporting database Transaction Summary..[https://bip2-
ext.theglobalfund.org/analytics/saw.dll?Dashboard] Accessed 13/07/2017. Source of figure, Authors 
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Annex 2. Mind Map Constraints impeding growth of commercial 
sector on LLINs (source: Authors) 
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